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Japan’s Tradition and Modernity 
in Eisenstadt’s Sociological Formulation
LEE Yu-Ting
	 S.	N.	Eisenstadt	 (1923-2010)	was	 an	 Israeli	 sociologist	 renowned	 for	 his	 fruitful	
and	 diversified	 research.	 Among	 his	 many	 contributions,	 one	 of	 particular	 interest	 to	
cultural	 interaction	 studies	 is	 his	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 civilizations.	 This	 branch	 of	
study	took	shape	early	in	Eisenstadt’s	career	and	later	developed	into	a	grand	theoretical	
framework	which	 attempts	 to	 outline	 and	 explain	 the	 different	 paths	 from	 tradition	 to	
modernity	 in	 different	 societies	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 conceptual,	 structural,	 and	
institutional	 changes.	 From	 this	 framework	 came	 Eisenstadt’s	 study	 of	 Japanese	
civilization,	 which	 claims	 Japan	 occupies	 a	 unique	 position	 in	 world	 history	 for	 its	 not	
having	 followed	 a	 “regular”	 route	 towards	 modernity.	 This	 paper	 explores	 Eisenstadt’s	
macro-sociological,	 theory-oriented	 characterization	 of	 Japan	 and	 tries	 to	 indicate	 both	
the	advantages	and	the	limitations	of	his	unconventional	methodology	and	perspective.	
	 Keywords:	Eisenstadt,	tradition,	modernity,	comparative	study	of	civilizations,	Japan
I.	Introduction
1. Scope and focuses of Eisenstadt’s research
	 Shmuel	Noah	Eisenstadt,	an	eminent	sociologist	at	Hebrew	University	of	Jerusalem	who	was	born	in	1923,	
died	 on	 September	 2,	 2010.	 Eisenstadt’s	 prolific	 career	 had	 helped	 to	 modify	 and	 solidify	 many	 theories	
developed	 by	 his	 predecessors	 such	 as	 Max	 Weber	 (1864-1920),	 Talcott	 Parsons	 (1902-1979),	 Edward	 Shils	
(1910-1995),	etc.,	as	well	as	created	several	issues	current	for	debates.	
	 In	celebration	of	Eisenstadt’s	sixtieth	birthday,	a	collection	of	essays	contributed	by	sociologists	around	the	
world	was	edited	and	 then	published	 in	1985.	According	 to	 the	editors,	 since	 it	was	difficult	 for	 them	 to	find	a	
central	theme	to	cover	the	vast	scope	of	Eisenstadt’s	work	which	delved	into	many	major	fields	of	sociology,	the	
title	of	Comparative Social Dynamics	was	chosen	to	represent	Eisenstadt’s	general	concern.1）
	 Such	 a	 vague	 term	 of	 “social	 dynamics”	 gained	 a	 center	 of	 gravity	 in	 a	 collection	 of	 Eisenstadt’s	 hand-
picked	essays,	which	was	published	in	2003	and	entitled	Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities.	By	
	 1）	 See	Cohen,	Erik;	Lissak,	Moshe;	Almagor,	Uri	eds.:	Comparative Social Dynamics: Essays in Honor of S. N. Eisenstandt	(West-
view	Press,	1985),	p.	ix.	This	collection	is	divided	into	five	parts	which	epitomize	the	main	areas	to	which	Eisenstadt’s	research	
before	1983	were	directed.	They	are:	1.	Process	and	change	in	tribal	and	historical	societies;	2.	Modernization;	3.	Sociology	of	
science;	4.	Israeli	society;	and	5.	Sociological	and	anthropological	theory.
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the	title	and	divisions	of	the	book	we	get	a	clearer	picture	of	how	Eisenstadt	evaluated	his	lifelong	research:	his	
work	was	conducted	within	the	framework	of	comparative	study	of	civilizations	and	the	most	intriguing	issue	for	
him	was	that	of	modernity	in	plural	forms.2）	
	 Although	Eisenstadt	 also	 paid	much	 effort	 to	 the	 exploration	 of	 tradition,	 as	we	 are	 now	 able	 to	 view	his	
career	with	 the	benefit	of	hindsight	 it	can	be	said	 that	 tradition	(or	 traditionality)	of	a	society	 in	his	elaboration	
was	to	serve	as	a	source	of	explaining	its	modernity.	In	other	words,	while	“social	dynamics”	is	a	proper	term	to	
summarize	Eisenstadt’s	works,	such	dynamics	was	endowed	with	a	keen	historical	and	even	causal	sense	 in	his	
later	research	where	Eisenstadt	sought	strenuously	to	expound	the	nature	and	features	of	modernity	in	connection	
with	 tradition.	Since	different	 and	heterogeneous	 traditions	give	 rise	 to	 “multiple	modernities,”	 to	 complete	his	
theoretical	generalization,	Eisenstadt	had	to	conduct	research	in	a	comparative	manner.	The	purpose	of	this	paper	
is	to	demonstrate	how	Eisenstadt	formulated	his	view	on	Japanese	civilization	in	this	frame,	and	attempt	to	point	
out	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	Eisenstadt’s	methodology.
2. Japan in the comparative study of civilizations
	 As	 noted	 by	Eisenstadt,	 although	 Japan	 first	 entered	 the	Western	 eyes	 as	 a	mere	 alien	 country	 in	 the	 16
th
	
century,	it	soon	became	distinct	from	other	exotic,	fascinating	cases	for	the	West	and	drew	critical	attention,	first	
for	its	cultural	and	social	sophistication	which	distinguished	it	from	other	“barbarian”	countries,	and	later	for	its	
phenomenal	 rise	 to	 a	 world	 power,	 initially	 a	 military	 and	 then	 an	 economic	 one.3）	 Indeed,	 Japan’s	 rapid,	
successful	modernization	 has	 long	 piqued	 the	 curiosity	 of	many	Western	 scholars	 and	 kept	 them	 reflecting	 on	
some	fundamental	assumptions	of	their	own	culture.	Of	course,	each	kind	of	discourse	on	Japan	follows	its	own	
logic	to	attribute	Japan’s	achievement	of	modernization	to	certain	historical	conditions	and	traditional	inheritances	
and	 there	are	already	abundant	 studies	produced	along	 this	vein.	 In	 this	 regard,	what	 is	peculiar	 to	Eisenstadt’s	
study	 is	his	 extensive	absorption	of	 literature	on	 Japanese	civilization	written	 in	Western	 languages	 (he	did	not	
read	Japanese)	and	subsequent	accommodation	of	those	perspectives	to	his	frame	of	comparative	sociology.	For	
example,	while	Reischauer	(1910-1990)	speaks	of	the	uniqueness	of	Japanese	society	as	follows:	
Even	today,	Japan	occupies	a	unique	place	in	the	world	as	the	one	major	industrialized	and	fully	modernized	
nation	that	has	a	non-Western	cultural	background.4）
Eisenstadt	recasts	this	general	statement	in	very	theoretical	terms:
	 2）	 See	Eisenstadt,	S.	N.:	Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities: A Collection of Essays	(Brill	Academic	Publishers,	
2003).	The	five	major	parts	into	which	the	book	is	divided	are:	1.	Theoretical	approach;	2.	Axial	civilizations;	3.	Modernity	as	
civilization;	4.	The	historical	and	civilizational	framework	of	Western	modernity;	and	5.	Multiple	modernities.
	 3）	 Eisenstadt,	S.	N.,	Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View	(The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1996),	p.	1.
	 4）	 Reischauer,	Edwin	O.;	Jansen,	Marius	B.,	The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity, Enlarged Edition	(The	Belknap	Press	of	
Harvard	University	Press,	1995),	pp.31-32.
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One	of	 the	many	paradoxes	Japan	presents	 for	comparative	historical	analysis	 is	 that	 this	first,	and	at	 least	
until	 recently	only,	 fully	successful	non-Western	modernization	has	been	 that	of	a	non-Axial	civilization,	a	
civilization	 that	 could	 not	 be	 seen	 –	 to	 use	 terms	 employed	 by,	 among	 others,	 Max	Weber	 –	 as	 a	 great	
religion	or	a	world	religion.5）
As	I	will	elaborate	on	the	theory	of	Axial	Age	civilizations	in	the	following	chapter,	here	the	citation	only	serves	
to	 point	 out	 how	 specific	 Eisenstadt’s	 perspective	 is.	 He	 assumed	 a	 theoretical	 paradigm	 against	 which	 a	
civilization	 is	 measured	 and	 claimed	 paradoxical	 once	 it	 does	 not	 follow	 a	 regular	 or	 well-explained	 route	 of	
development.	
	 At	the	end	of	introduction,	it	is	noteworthy	that	in	Japan	Eisenstadt	is	reputed	for	his	sophisticated	theory	of	
modernization,	 however,	 his	 comparative	 study	 of	 civilizations	 seems	 to	 be	 less	 appealing	 here.	 For	 instance,	
while	 Kinbara	 Samon	 accurately	 points	 out	 that	 Eisenstadt	 contextualized	 Japanese	 modernization	 within	 its	
specific	 historical	 dynamics,	 Kinbara’s	 summary	 stresses	 only	 the	 influence	 of	 Tokugawa	 regime	 on	 Japan’s	
development	 into	 a	 modern	 nation-state,	 largely	 ignoring	 that	 Eisenstadt	 attempted	 to	 trace	 the	 ideological	
fountainhead	of	Japanese	modernity	 far	back	 to	 its	antiquity.6）	Taking	a	historical	stance,	 this	article	 focuses	on	
Eisenstadt’s	 characterization	 of	 Japan’s	 unique	 path	 from	 tradition	 to	 modernity.	 Such	 analysis	 requires	
explication	 of	 theories	 first	 and	 then	 their	 application	 to	 Japan.	 Meanwhile,	 I	 will	 try	 to	 present	 Eisenstadt’s	
arguments	in	chronological	order	with	critical	evaluations.	
II.	Tradition:	endurance	and	change
1. Dynamics of traditions
	 The	 relationship	 between	 tradition	 and	modernity	 experienced	 change	 of	 concept	 in	 sociology	 during	 the	
mid-	 to	 late-twentieth	 century.	 Before	 the	 1960s,	 Western	 scholars	 commonly	 believed	 in	 the	 embedded	
dichotomy	between	 traditional	and	modern	societies.	However,	 in	a	1968	article	Eisenstadt	had	already	given	a	
functional	account	of	tradition:
We	view	social	and	cultural	traditions,	first,	as	the	major	ways	of	looking	at	the	basic	problems	of	social	and	
cultural	order,	and	of	posing	the	major	questions	about	them;	second,	as	giving	various	possible	answers	to	
these	problems;	and,	third,	as	the	organization	of	institutional	structures	for	implementing	different	types	of	
solutions	or	answers	to	these	problems.7）
	 5）	 Eisenstadt,	Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View,	p.	428.
	 6）	 See	Kinbara,	Samon	(金原左門),	Turns of the Theory of Modernization and Historical Narratives	(「近代化」論の転回と歴史叙
述)	(Chuo	University	Press,	1999),	pp.117-130.
	 7）	 Eisenstadt,	Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities: A Collection of Essays,	p.135.
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In	short,	the	main	function	of	tradition	lies	in,	when	confronting	social	problems,	its	provision	of	a	specific	way	
of	perceiving,	attempting	at	answering,	and	finally	settling	the	problems.	Such	view	gained	a	clearer	articulation	
in	 Tradition, Change, and Modernity	 published	 in	 1973,	 where	 Eisenstadt	 argues	 that,	 although	 “modernity”	
poses	to	various	societies	a	set	of	distinct	problems	requiring	specific	methods	of	response,	in	each	society		such	
responses	to	“modernity”	may	be	similar	to	those	already	developed	in	previous	historical	periods.	That	is	to	say,	
there	 are	 similarities	 and	 continuities	 shown	 in	 society’s	 reactions	 to	 changes	 in	 history,	 including	 the	 change	
termed	modernization.	 This	 line	 of	 argument	 foreshadows	 Eisenstadt’s	 later	 idea	 of	 “multiple	 modernities”	 as	
different	patterns	of	 reaction	 to	historical	 change	 form	many	distinct	paths	 towards	modernity;	paths	 cannot	be	
considered	 as	 belonging	 to	 a	 uniform	 program.	More	 importantly,	 such	 recognition	 of	 the	 inner	 logic	 of	 each	
culture	 enabled	 Eisenstadt	 to	 trace	 the	 “multiple	 modernities”	 to	 their	 respective	 traditions,	 thus	 demanding	 a	
comparative	framework	for	analyzing	the	dynamics	of	civilizations	and	societies.8）	
2. Breakthroughs of the Axial Age civilizations
	 In	Eisenstadt’s	 extensive	 study	of	 traditions,	 the	 theory	 of	 greatest	 interest	 to	 him	was	 that	 of	 “Axial	Age	
civilizations,”	 a	 term	 coined	 by	 Karl	 Jaspers	 (1883-1969)	 in	The Origin and Purpose of History	 published	 in	
1949,9）	which	expounds	that	mutually	independent	cultural	breakthroughs	occurred	from	800	BCE	to	200	BCE	in	
the	world’s	major	civilizations	such	as	China,	India,	Greece,	Israel,	and	Persia.	Such	breakthroughs	not	only	left	
an	indelible	impact	on	each	civilization,	but	also	conditioned	each	culture’s	later	developments	until	today.
	 Despite	 Jaspers’	 being	 the	 creator	 of	 the	 term	 “Axial	Age,”	 the	 significance	 of	 this	 historical	 period	 had	
already	been	recognized	by	Weber	in	his	comparative	study	of	world	religions.10）	In	Chinese	academia,	Yü	Ying-
shih	 also	 indicates	 that	 Wen	 Yiduo	 (1899-1946)	 had	 noted	 the	 almost	 simultaneous	 awakening	 of	 literary	
creativity	in	China,	India,	Israel,	and	Greece	in	an	article	published	in	1943.11）	Furthermore,	as	scholars	point	out,	
Jaspers’	discussion	on	Axial	Age	was	conducted	in	the	field	of	philosophy	of	history,	whereas	Eisenstadt’s	study	
fleshed	out	Jaspers’	conceptual	structure	and	was	informed	by	the	spirit	of	Weber’s	comparative	sociology.12）	
	 Although	 the	 so-called	Axial	Age	 triggered	 by	 no	 means	 a	 uniform	 mode	 of	 transformation	 in	 different	
cultures,	 some	 procedural	 characteristics	 common	 to	 those	 breakthroughs	 were	 generalized	 by	 Eisenstadt	 as	
follows:
	 8）	 See	Eisenstadt,	S.	N.:	Tradition, Change, and Modernity	(A	Wiley-Interscience	Publication,	1973),	pp.	v-vii.
	 9）	 Original	in	German:	Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte.	Bullock,	Michael	tr.:	The Origin and Goal of History	(Routledge	&	
Kegan	Paul	Ltd,	1953).
10）	 As	noted	in	Eisenstadt,	S.	N.,	“Introduction:	The	Axial	Age	Breakthroughs	–	Their	Characteristics	and	Origins”	in	Eisenstadt,	S.	
N.	ed.:	The Origin and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations	(State	University	of	New	York	Press,	1986),	pp.	1-2.
11）	 Yü,	Ying-shih	(余英時),	Intellectuals and the Value of Chinese Culture (知識人與中國文化的價值)	(China	Times	Press,	2007),	
pp.72-73.
12）	 See	Arnason,	Johann	P.	et	al.:	“Introduction:	History,	Theory	and	Interpretation,”	in	Arnason,	Johann	P.	et	al.	eds.:	Axial Civiliza-
tions and World History	(Brill	Academic	Publishers,	2004),	p.15;	Spohn,	Willfried,	“Eisenstadt	on	Civilizations	and	Multiple	
Modernity,”	in	European Journal of Social Theory,	4(4),	2001,	p.502.
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1.	Emergence	of	a	tension	between	the	transcendental	and	mundane	orders;
2.	Attempt	of	a	few	intellectual	elites	to	model	the	world	upon	a	transcendental	vision;
3.	Successful	institutionalization	of	the	vision	and	an	ensuing	reordering	of	society;
4.	Change	in	the	dynamic	of	history.
	13）
The	emergence	of	each	of	these	traditions	was	the	result	of	complicated	social	processes	and	can	by	no	means	be	
understood	in	a	predestined	or	teleological	way.	However,	what	interested	Eisenstadt	was	not	the	background	but	
the	unfolding	and	institutionalization	of	such	cultural	breakthrough:	a	small	group	of	intellectual	elites	in	specific	
cultural	milieus	were	awakened	to	assume	reflective	attitudes	towards	human	life	and	the	cosmos;	they	felt	urged	
to	bridge	 the	gap	between	 the	 two	worlds	by	way	of	 reconstructing	human	behavior,	which	now	pursued	some	
higher	moral	or	metaphysical	order,	and	then	to	perpetuate	that	formula.	It	was	the	different	interpretations	of	the	
gap	 and	 the	 ensuing	 divergent	 programs	 of	 reconstruction,	 combined	 with	 specific	 social	 conditions	 that	
facilitated	 or	 obstructed	 such	 development,	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 unique	 crystallization	 of	 each	 Axial	 Age	
civilization	and	“ushered	in	a	new	type	of	social	and	civilizational	dynamic	in	the	history	of	mankind.”14）	
	 As	mentioned	above,	no	change	in	history	is	blind	to	its	own	tradition.	Nevertheless,	the	change	in	ontology	
and	cosmology	that	took	place	in	this	period	was	so	radical	that	all	surviving	traditions	were	subject	to	reappraisal	
and	became	a	constitutive	part	of	 the	new	spirit,	without	occupying	the	most	creative	sphere	of	 the	culture	they	
had	 previously.	The	 blossoming	 and	 subsequent	 of	 institutionalization	 of	Axial	Age	 civilizations,	 in	 their	 turn,	
grew	into	sources	from	which	every	later	development	in	history	derived.	This	strong	historical	sense	leads	to	two	
of	Eisenstadt’s	critical	observations.	First,	modernity	owes	 its	origin	 to	one	of	 these	great	 traditions,	 that	 is,	 the	
Western	European	society	 (which	 is	 the	combination	of	Greek	and	 Israeli	civilizations);	and	second,	 Japan	as	a	
successful	modernized	country	constitutes	a	special	case	for	not	belonging	to	any	Axial	Age	civilizations.	
	 Before	treating	the	two	points,	here	it	should	be	noted	that,	in	Eisenstadt’s	views	–	as	it	will	become	clearer	
–	 the	 dynamics	 of	 tradition	 was	 very	 often	 understood	 in	 its	 relation	 to	 modernity.	 This	 relational	 scheme	
corrected	 the	 bias	 of	 dichotomizing	 tradition	 and	modernity	 prevalent	 before	 the	 mid-twentieth	 century,	 but	 a	
problem	also	emerged:	tradition	was	not	treated	in	its	full	complexity;	rather,	it	was	reduced	and	compressed	into	
a	causal	and	comparative	model	to	make	explanation	for	modernity.	In	other	words,	despite	being	intellectual,	this	
model	to	a	certain	degree	seems	too	theoretically-laden	to	be	truly	historical.
13）	 Eisenstadt,	“Introduction:	The	Axial	Age	Breakthroughs	–	Their	Characteristics	and	Origins”	in	The Origin and Diversity of Ax-
ial Age Civilizations,	p.1.	This	summary	is,	however,	of	my	own.
14）	 Ibid,	pp.3-4.
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III.	Modernity:	one	or	many?
1. From modernity to multiple modernities 
	 Early	in	Eisenstadt’s	career,	he	had	been	a	powerful	objector	of	 the	“classical”	view	of	modernization	held	
by	Marx	 (1818-1883),	Durkheim	 (1858-1917),	 and	 even	by	Weber.	Such	view	–	which	was	prevalent	 until	 the	
mid-twentieth	century	and	is	by	no	means	obliterated	today	–	assumed	that	the	program	of	modernity	developed	
in	Western	Europe	will	ultimately	prevail	throughout	the	world.	In	other	words,	Western	modernity	was	supposed	
to	 lead	 to	 the	 convergence	 of	 industrial	 societies,	 which	 means	 all	 modernized	 societies	 will	 eventually	 be	
reduced	 to	 a	 same	 cultural	 unit.	Among	 such	 claims	 of	 the	 predominance	 of	Western	modernity,	Max	Weber’s	
proposition	is	particularly	famous	for	his	attribution	of	Western	development	to	“the	tendency	towards	the	overall	
rationalization	of	 social	 life,”	 the	 root	of	which	 could	be	 found	 in	 the	Protestant	 ethic,	 although	 such	 tendency	
was	not	totally	alien	to	other	major	religious	traditions.15）
	 However,	 historical	 experiences	 negated	 the	 assumption	 of	 one	 universal	 program	 of	 modernity	 and	
witnessed	 the	emergence	of	 essentially	different	modern	 societies.	Such	 recognition	brought	 scholars	 to	 rework	
their	perspectives	and	it	was	in	this	circumstance	that	Eisenstadt’s	proposition	of	“multiple	modernities”	gradually	
came	 to	 fruition.16）	 Specifically,	 while	 Eisenstadt	 never	 held	 a	 monistic	 view	 of	 modernity,	 according	 to	 my	
survey	of	his	writings,	the	term	“multiple	modernities”	appeared	only	in	the	last	years	of	the	20
th
	century,	serving	
especially	 as	 a	 counterargument	 against	 Francis	 Fukuyama’s	 claim	of	 the	 “end	 of	 history,”	which	 presages	 the	
predominance	 of	 market	 economy	 and	 liberal	 world-view	 in	 the	 age	 of	 globalization,	 and	 against	 Samuel	
Huntington’s	 (1927-2008)	 prediction	 of	 the	 “clash	 of	 civilizations,”	 which	 contrasts	Western	 civilization	 with	
other	civilizations	often	in	hostile	terms	and	rarely	considers	ways	of	mediation	and	cooperation.17）	Although	the	
two	propositions	 are	 opposite	 to	 each	 other,	 in	Eisenstadt’s	 view,	 they	 both	 derived	 from	 the	 same	 tradition	 of	
taking	 Western	 modernity	 as	 a	 universal	 model.	 While	 the	 former	 foresees	 the	 eventual	 triumph	 of	 Western	
15）	 See,	S.	N.	“Introduction:	Historical	Traditions,	Modernization	and	Development,”	in	Eisenstadt,	S.	N.	ed.:	Patterns of Modernity 
Volume I: The West	(Frances	Pinter,	1987),	pp.1-12.	The	major	manifestations	of	the	Western	modernity	are:	the	emergence	of	
capitalist	civilization,	the	bureaucratization	of	different	forms	of	social	life,	the	secularization	of	the	world-view,	the	develop-
ment	of	modern	science,	the	reconfiguration	of	the	center-periphery	relation,	the	reexamination	of	the	legitimacy	of	tradition	and	
authority,	the	conscious	human	activity	and	participation,	and	attempts	at	the	formation	of	a	“rational”	culture,	an	efficient	econ-
omy,	and	civil	(class)	society	and	nation-states,	etc.
16）	 For	a	detailed	and	theoretical	discussion	on	“multiple	modernities,”	see	Eisenstadt,	S.	N.,	“Multiple	Modernities,”	in	Eisenstadt,	
S.	N.	ed.:	Multiple Modernities	(Transaction	Publishers,	2002),	pp.1-29.	For	a	brief	introduction	of	the	term’s	history,	see:	Eisen-
stadt,	S.	N.,	et	al.:	“The	Context	of	the	Multiple	Modernities	Paradigm,”	in	Sachsenmaier,	Dominic;	Eisenstadt,	S.	N.;	Riedel,	
Jens	eds.:	Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese and Other Interpretations	(Leiden:	Brill	Academic	Publish-
ers,	2002),	pp.1-23,	in	which	we	find	a	succinct	definition:	“The	core	of	multiple	modernities	lies	in	assuming	the	existence	of	
culturally	specific	forms	of	modernity	shaped	by	distinct	cultural	heritages	and	sociopolitical	conditions.	Their	forms	will	con-
tinue	to	differ	in	their	value	systems,	institutions,	and	other	factors.”
17）	 Eisenstadt,	Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities: A Collection of Essays,	pp.519-522.
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values,	the	latter	confronts	the	modern	West	with	other	traditional,	fundamentalist,	anti-modern,	and	anti-Western	
civilizations,	among	them	the	Islamic	and	Confucian	societies	are	the	most	notable.18）
2. Modernity as a specific type of civilization
	 In	 delivering	 the	 idea	 of	 modernity	 from	 a	 narrow,	 Western	 paradigm,	 Eisenstadt	 never	 dismissed	 the	
prevalence	 and	 shaping	 force	 of	Western	modernity,	whose	 expansion	with	 unprecedented	 economic,	 political,	
and	 ideological	 forces	 has	 been	 stimulating	 those	 societies	 under	 its	 sway	 to	 make	 specific	 responses	 to	 and	
interpretations	of	it.	On	this	premise,	Eisenstadt	came	to	view	such	program	of	modernity	with	all	of	its	specific	
considerations	and	social	mechanisms	as	a	unique	civilization.
	 Although	 the	 notion	 of	 “modernity	 as	 one	 type	 of	 civilization”	 received	 early	 attention	 in	 Eisenstadt’s	
writings,19）	it	was	in	somewhat	later	stage	that	this	thesis	put	on	theoretical	weight,	being	connected	directly	with	
another	 theoretical	 construct,	 that	 is,	 the	 Axial	 Age	 civilizations.20）	 Critically,	 Eisenstadt	 not	 only	 revamps	
Weber’s	 argument	 to	 claim	 that	modernity	 “developed	 in	 one	 of	 the	Great	Axial	Civilizations	 –	 the	Christian-
European	one,”21）	but	even	designates	modernity	as	“the	Second	Axial	Age,	in	which	a	distinct	cultural,	political	
and	institutional	program	crystallized	and	expanded	throughout	most	of	the	world.”22）
	 That	is	to	say,	while	in	earlier	works	Eisenstadt	modestly	argued	that	modernity	is	traditionally	conditioned,	
in	 later	 time	 he	 expressly	 recognized	Axial	Age	 civilization	 and	 modernity	 to	 be	 culturally,	 structurally,	 and	
ideologically	 similar.	Holding	 this	 view,	 it	 is	 understandable	 that	Eisenstadt	 regards	 the	 core	 of	modernity	first	
and	 foremost	 as	 “the	 crystallization	 and	development	of	mode	or	modes	of	 interpretation	of	 the	world,”	which	
brought	forth	essentially	an	ontological	transformation	followed	by	new	institutional	formations.23）	This	statement	
is	 reminiscent	 of	 the	 view	 that	 it	 was	 the	 different	 interpretations	 of	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 transcendental	 and	
mundane	 orders	 that	 had	 oriented	 each	Axial	Age	 civilization	 towards	 its	 development	 into	 a	 “great	 tradition.”	
However,	what	differentiates	the	two	changes	is	the	degree	of	reflexivity,	for
[t]he	 reflexivity	 that	 developed	 in	 the	 modern	 program	 not	 only	 focused	 on	 the	 possibility	 of	 different	
interpretations	 of	 core	 transcendental	 visions	 and	 basic	 ontological	 conceptions	 prevalent	 in	 a	 particular	
society	or	civilization;	 it	came	 to	question	 the	very	givenness	of	such	visions	and	 the	 institutional	patterns	
18）	 Eisenstadt,	“Multiple	Modernities,”	in	Multiple Modernities,	p.3.
19）	 One	of	its	precedents	is	“modernity”	as	a	new	type	of	“great	tradition,”	in	contrast	to	“Axial	Age	civilizations”	as	“Great	Tradi-
tions.”	See	Eisenstadt	S.	N.,	“Modernity	as	A	New	Type	of	‘Great	Tradition’”	in	Tradition, Change, and Modernity,	pp.203-211.
20）	 See	Eisenstadt,	S.	N.,	“The	Civilizational	Dimension	of	Modernity:	Modernity	as	a	Distinct	Civilization,”	in	Comparative Civili-
zations and Multiple Modernities: A Collection of Essays,	pp.493-518.
21）	 Ibid,	p.493.
22）	 Ibid,	p.494.
23）	 Ibid,	p.493.
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related	to	them.24）
Moreover,	what	is	central	 to	this	modern	program	is	considered	by	Eisenstadt	as	“a	belief	in	the	possibility	that	
society	 could	 be	 actively	 formed	 by	 conscious	 human	 activity,”25）	 so	 radical	 was	 this	 belief	 that	 its	 secular	
Utopian	ideal	threatened	to	redirect	the	entrenched	dynamics	of	history.
	 In	 my	 personal	 view,	 not	 until	 this	 stage	 that	 it	 becomes	 clear	 why	 Eisenstadt	 tended	 to	 formulate	 his	
analyses	of	both	tradition	and	modernity	on	such	an	abstract	level	rather	than	in	more	tangible	terms.	As	has	been	
suggested,	what	he	aimed	at	was	a	causal	framework	which	sought	to	explain	social	and	institutional	changes	in	
ideological	terms.	Like	Jaspers,	Eisenstadt	understood	the	Axial	Age	marked	a	turning	point	in	human	cognition	
of	 history	 because	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 fundamental	 questions	 and	 attempts	 at	 resolution.26）	 As	 most	 institutions	
prevalent	 in	 current	 societies	 are	 crystallizations	of	 systematic	 responses	 to	ontological	 enquiries	or	 ideological	
tensions	originating	from	the	Axial	Age,	and	now	we	are	facing	the	extraordinary	historical	impetus	of	modernity	
threatening	 to	 revolutionize	much	of	human	establishment	but	actually	 in	a	way	not	 totally	deviating	 from	past	
experiences,	it	was	natural	for	Eisenstadt	to	connect	this	later	radical	change	to	the	former	one	on	an	ideological	
level	and	in	broadly	structural	terms.	Such	theorization	of	world	civilizations,	though	ambitious	and	eloquent,	is,	
in	my	 judgment,	made	possible	only	by	neglecting	a	myriad	of	context-specific	historical	details.	Yü	Ying-shih	
also	comments	 that	Eisenstadt’s	 characterization	of	modernity	 as	 the	 “Second	Axial	Age”	does	not	 sound	quite	
convincing.27）	
	 In	 any	 case,	 one	 of	 the	 merits	 of	 Eisenstadt’s	 project	 is	 that	 he	 places	 modernity	 in	 a	 macro-historical	
perspective,	and	distinguishes	it	as	a	unique	type	of	civilization.	In	the	meantime,	such	distinctness	of	modernity	
does	not	prevent	it	from	assuming	plural	forms,	which	are	all	variations	of	but	by	no	means	subject	to	the	model	
of	Western	European	modernity:
…Within	 all	 of	 them	 [i.e.	 respective	 traditions]	 developed	 distinct	 modern	 dynamics,	 distinctive	 ways	 of	
interpretation	 of	 modernity,	 for	 which	 the	 original	Western	 project	 constituted	 indeed	 the	 crucial	 starting	
point	and	continual	–	usually	ambivalent	–	reference	point.”28）
In	the	same	vein,	analogous	to	the	proposition	of	“multiple	modernities,”	the	model	of	“multiple	axialities”	was	
also	 suggested,	which	demystified	 a	more	or	 less	 uniform	world-wide	Axial	Age	 and	 sought	 to	 better	 illustrate	
how	different	Axial	Age	components	interacted	among	themselves	and	with	non-axial	civilizations	in	the	shaping	
24）	 Eisenstadt,	“Multiple	Modernities,”	in	Multiple Modernities,	p.4.
25）	 Ibid,	p.5.
26）	 See	Jaspers,	The Origin and Goal of History,	pp.7-8;	Eisenstadt,	“Introduction:	The	Axial	Age	Breakthroughs	–	Their	Character-
istics	and	Origins”	in	The Origin and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations,	pp.10-11.
27）	 Yü,	Intellectuals and the Value of Chinese Culture, p.73.
28）	 Eisenstadt,	Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities: A Collection of Essays,	p.504.
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of	world	histories.29）	Though	 this	was	not	 fully	developed	 in	Eisenstadt’s	 lifetime,	his	view	of	modernity	being	
conditioned	by	tradition,	and	of	plural	forms	of	modernity	bore	the	most	interesting	fruit	when	Japan	was	drawn	
into	comparison.	
IV.	Japan	in	historical	changes:	in	comparison	with	China
1. Japan as a non-Axial civilization
	 It	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 definition	 for	 Japan’s	 not	 belonging	 to	 any	 Axial	 Age	 civilization:	 it	 never	 in	 history	
experienced	 any	 form	 of	 drastic	 tension	 between	 the	 transcendental	 and	mundane	 orders.	 Such	 experience	 (or	
inexperience),	 according	 to	 Eisenstadt’s	 formulation	 (see	 Chapter	 II),	 enabled	 Japan	 to	 suffer	 low	 degree	 of	
ideologization	 of	 changes	 and	 struggles,	 because	 they	 did	 not	 tend	 to	 define	 things	 in	 absolute	 terms,	 which	
facilitated	 social	 mobilization	 and	 institutional	 transformation	 in	 Japan.30）	 Such	 relative	 ease	 towards	 changes	
without	 severe	 ideological	 conflicts	 seems,	 at	 least	 in	 Eisenstadt’s	 theory,	 largely	 accountable	 for	 the	 different	
historical	experiences	between	China	and	Japan	on	their	ways	to	modernity.	
	 To	best	illustrate	how	Japan	achieved	modernity	as	a	non-Axial	country,	let	me	start	with	China	to	see	how	
its	“axiality”	put	certain	restrictions	on	the	unfolding	of	history.	In	respect	of	the	transcendental	vision	developed	
in	China,	Eisenstadt	followed	Benjamin	Schwartz’s	(1916-1999)	view	that	in	the	Analects,	“heaven”	is	treated	by	
Confucius	 “not	 simply	 as	 the	 immanent	Tao〔 i.e. Dao, 道〕of	 nature	 and	 society	 but	 as	 a	 transcendental	will	
interested	in	Confucius’	redeeming	mission.”	Furthermore,	Confucius	referred	to	Tao	as	applying	“not	only	to	the	
objective	structures	of	 society	and	cosmos	but	also	 to	 the	 ‘inner	way’	of	 the	man	of	 jen〔 i.e. ren, 仁〕.”31）	 In	
short,	 through	 the	mediation	of	Dao	 the	 immanent	 and	 transcendental	worlds,	 the	moral	 and	natural	 forces	 are	
metaphysically	 connected.	 Consequently,	 in	 Confucian	 China	 where	 the	 transcendental	 concerns	 were	 largely	
moralized	 and	 secularized,	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 transcendental	 and	mundane	 was	 principally	 articulated	 in	
cultural	 terms.	This	particular	mode	of	 transcendence	–	 an	 inward	one	–	 led	 to	 a	uniquely	 this-worldly	way	of	
resolving	the	tension,	that	is,	“through	the	cultivation	of	the	social,	political,	and	cultural	orders	as	the	major	way	
of	maintaining	 the	cosmic	harmony.”32）	Since	such	a	world-view	put	heavy	stress	on	order	and	harmony	in	any	
relationship,	 it	 required	 “proper	 conduct	 and	 attitude,	 which	 necessitates	 a	 very	 stringent	 and	 reflexive	 self-
discipline.”	This	 tendency,	 however,	 brought	 out	 no	 institutional	 breakthroughs	 in	China	 since	 the	 empire	 took	
shape	 in	 the	 3
rd
	 century	BCE.	Most	 importantly,	 the	 inseparability	 of	 cultural	 and	 political	 functions	 in	 such	 a	
29）	 Eisenstadt,	S.	N.	“Axial	Civilizations	and	the	Axial	Age	Reconsidered,”	in	Axial Civilizations and World History,	p.	531.
30）	 Eisenstadt,	Japanese Civilization: A Comparative Perspective,	p.	420.
31）	 Schwartz,	“Transcendence	in	Ancient	China,”	in	Daedalus	(Spring	1975),	p.64.	Cited	in	Eisenstadt,	“Introduction:	The	Axial	Age	
Breakthrough	in	China	and	India,”	in	The Origin and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations,	p.292.	Jen	is	defined	by	Schwartz	as	
“inner	moral	perfection.”
32）	 Eisenstadt,	“Introduction:	The	Axial	Age	Breakthrough	in	China	and	India,”	in	Eisenstadt	ed.:	The Origin and Diversity of Axial 
Age Civilizations,	p.293.
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system	 soon	 equated	 emerging	 professional	 intellectuals	 with	 political	 functionaries,	 as	 well	 as	 bound	 the	
Confucian	literati-bureaucrats	to	the	political	center	as	a	special	social	stratum	with	little	autonomy.	This	structure	
in	turn	hindered	the	possibility	of	economic	and	cultural	breakthroughs.33）
	 From	this	specifically	ideological	viewpoint,	the	historical	development	of	Japan	was	contrary	to	the	Chinese	
case.	 The	 lack	 of	 the	 tension	 characteristic	 of	 the	 Axial	 Age	 civilizations	 led	 the	 Japanese	 to	 a	 primordial,	
uncritical	world	view	and	cosmology,	which	imposed	no	urge	on	intellectual	elites	to	bridge	that	gap	by	modeling	
the	world	order	upon	transcendental	precepts.	This	phenomenon,	 in	 turn,	reduced	disputations	among	elites	 to	a	
low	degree,	thus	producing	rare	differentiation	between	professionals,	between	orthodox	and	heterodoxies,	and	so	
forth.	 Accordingly,	 historical	 dynamics	 in	 Japan	 acquired	 an	 exceptional	 flexibility	 to	 change	 without	 much	
ideological	 obstruction.	One	brilliant	 example	of	 this	flexibility	 is	 Japan’s	 ability	 to	 transform,	or	 Japanize,	 the	
transcendental,	universalistic	orientations	of	Confucianism	and	Buddhism	into	an	immanentist	and	particularistic	
direction.	
	 In	the	face	of	foreign	influences	Japan	always	demonstrates	“an	openness	to	them	combined	with	a	tendency	
to	 Japanize	 them	 with	 but	 little	 effect	 on	 the	 basic	 Japanese	 ontological	 premises	 and	 conceptions	 of	 social	
order.”34）	 However,	 the	 perennial	 practice	 of	 Japanization	 evinces	 that	 “Japan	 always	 lived	 with	 these	 other	
civilizations	but	was	never	one	of	 them.	 It	 continuously	maintained	 its	 conscious	collective	uniqueness	and	 the	
distinctiveness	 of	 its	 civilizational	 premises.”	 In	 this	 circumstance,	 Japan	 was	 stimulated	 to	 develop	 certain	
ideological	discourse	to	distinguish	itself	from	others.	It	was	the	intensive	reflexivity	shown	in	the	discourse	that	
separated	Japan	from	other	non-axial	civilizations,	bringing	it	closer	to	Axial	ones.35）
	 Given	 the	 lack	 of	 dichotomy	 between	 the	 transcendental	 and	 mundane	 worlds,	 Japanese	 collectivity	 was	
defined	 in	 contextual	 terms	 in	 which	 many	 sacred	 and	 natural	 elements	 were	 amalgamated	 without	 being	
absolutized	and	ideologized.36）	Such	continuity	can	also	be	found	in	interpersonal	relations.	As	Japanese	society	
was	primarily	defined	in	primordial	kinship	terms,	such	framework	facilitated	the	extension	of	trust	from	family	
to	broader	settings.	Similarly,	since	Japanese	elites	were	not	ideologically	orientated,	they	raised	no	opposition	to	
the	extension	of	trust	under	guise	of	universalistic	principles.37）
	 As	to	Japanese	attitudes	towards	tradition,	it	is	argued	that	because	there	was	no	conception	of	discontinuities	
in	 cosmic	 time,	 corresponding	 discontinuities	 in	 mundane	 time	 did	 not	 exist	 either.	 Therefore,	 the	 Japanese	
generally	perceived	no	break	or	change	between	different	regimes	or	historical	stages.	This	very	notion	brought	
Japanese	to	assume	the	mythical	continuity	of	imperial	symbolism,	which	is	epitomized	by	reconstruction	of	the	
emperor	 system	 under	 the	 Meiji	 regime.38）	 Critically,	 Japan	 is	 considered	 one	 of	 the	 few	 countries	 whose	
33）	 Eisenstadt,	Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View,	p.	415.
34）	 Ibid,	p.	425
35）	 Eisenstadt,	S.	N.,	The Great Revolutions and the Civilizations of Modernity	(Brill	Academic	Publishers,	2006),	pp.94-95.
36）	 Ibid,	p.96.
37）	 Eisenstadt,	Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View,	pp.425-426.
38）	 Ibid,	pp.423-424.
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modernization	was	realized	“under	the	aegis	of	traditional	symbols	and	even	traditional	elites.”39）
2. Japan’s neo-traditional way towards modernization
	 Since	modernity	is	an	idea	triggered	in	and	even	imposed	by	the	West,	Japan,	like	many	other	civilizations,	
felt	urged	to	search	for	their	own	place	in	the	new	world	dominated	by	the	West.40）	However,	quite	different	from	
most	Asian	countries,	Japan	was	never	colonized.	That	is	to	say,	Japan’s	program	of	modernity	was	not	exercised	
by	external	force,	but	by	the	Meiji	Restoration.	
	 Although	the	 translation	of	Meiji Isshin	as	Meiji	Restoration	has	 long	drawn	disputation,	Eisenstadt	argues	
that	 there	 are	 several	 factors	 preventing	 the	 event	 from	 being	 a	 true	 “revolution,”	 including	 a	 lack	 of	 tension	
between	 the	 transcendental	 and	 mundane	 orders,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 ideological	 breakthroughs	 and	 institutional	
overturns.	On	 the	one	hand,	 just	 like	 the	so-called	 revolutions,	 the	way	 towards	modernity	guided	by	 the	Meiji	
government	gave	rise	to	a	new	cultural	and	political	program,	which	was	designed	to	transform	Japanese	society	
to	 a	 degree	 equal	 to	 those	 brought	 about	 by	 Western	 modernity.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 was	 a	 movement	
“proclaimed	as	a	renovation	of	an	older	archaic	system,	which	in	fact	had	never	existed,	and	not	as	a	revolution	
aiming	to	change	the	social	and	political	order,	to	reconstruct	state	and	society	alike,	according	to	principles	that	
transcended	 them.”41）	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 the	 Meiji	 government	 strategically	 prevented	 possible	 ideological	
confrontation	 by	 retaining	 or	 even	 reinventing	 old	 political	 symbols.	 Whole	 institutions	 were	 actually	
reconstructed.	 Since	 to	 gain	 a	 solid	 footing	 on	 the	 global	 stage	 was	 the	 prime	 concern,	 what	 the	 movement	
struggled	for	was	a	high	adaptability	combined	with	a	restorationist	vision.	Consequently,	what	 the	Meiji Isshin	
brought	about	was	“an	almost	uniquely	successful	 initial	modernization	based	on	neo-traditional	orientation	and	
symbols.”42）	
	 In	contrast	to	the	flexibility	of	Japan,	Chinese	intellectual	and	political	elites	were	more	structurally	bound:
The	identity	between	the	cultural	and	political	orders	and	the	specific	characteristics	of	the	literati	tended	to	
maintain	the	dominance	of	a	stagnant	neo-traditionalism	that	continuously	reinforced	the	non-transformative	
orientations	of	Chinese	culture.43）
The	 search	 for	 Japanese	 authenticity	 also	 constituted	 a	 main	 focus	 of	 modernization.	 “That	 search	 oscillated	
between	the	negation	of	modernity	–	denied	mostly	as	Western	modernity	―	and	the	appropriation	of	modernity	
39）	 Eisenstadt,	Tradition, Change, and Modernity,	p.	99.
40）	 Eisenstadt,	Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View,	pp.428-429.
41）	 Ibid,	p.430.
42）	 Eisenstadt,	S.	N.,	“The	Protestant	Ethic	Thesis	in	an	Analytical	and	Comparative	Framework,”	in	Eisenstadt	S.	N.,	ed.:	The Prot-
estant Ethic and Modernization: A Comparative View	(Basic	Books,	1968),	p.29.
43）	 Eisenstadt,	Tradition, Change, and Modernity,	p.274.
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manifest	 in	 attempts	 to	 identify	 a	 truly	 Japanese…modernity.”44）	 The	 extreme	 of	 such	 kind	 of	 discourse,	
unfortunately,	 went	 into	 the	 service	 of	 fascist	 nationalism.	 Generally	 speaking,	 however,	 in	 search	 for	 Japan’s	
authenticity	 and	 tradition,	what	made	 the	 Japanese	discourse	of	modernity	distinct	 from	others’	was	 its	flexible	
way	of	defining	traditionality	and	accommodating	new	ideas.	New	ways	of	life	were	easily	adopted,	thus,	“there	
did	not	develop	a	sharp	confrontation	between	traditionality	and	modernity.”45）	Neither	was	there	a	rigid	dividing	
line	between	“authentic”	Japanese	and	the	Western	modes:
Tradition	 and	 traditionalism	 constituted	 a	 sort	 of	 general	 orientation,	 often	 identified	 with	 what	 was	
authentically	Japanese,	 in	the	name	of	which	many	activities	and	organizations,	old	and	new,	were	brought	
together	and	legitimized.46）
It	is	such	flexibility,	adaptability,	and	a	the	non-confrontational	attitude	that	distinguished	Japanese	modernity	not	
only	 from	 the	Western	 paradigm,	 but	 also	 from	 the	 resistant	mode	 of	 other	Axial	 or	 non-Axial	 civilizations.	 It	
may	 be	 not	 far-fetched	 to	 conclude	 that	 Japan	 serves	 as	 the	 best	 example	 for	 Eisenstadt’s	 theory	 of	 “multiple	
modernities”,	in	view	of	its	self-conscious	incorporation	of	tradition	into	modernity.	Again	we	find	a	contrasting	
situation	in	China	in	its	confrontation	with	Western	culture:	Chinese	tended	to	hold	the	extreme	attitude	of	either	
rejecting	 their	 tradition	 or	 negating	 Western	 values.	 “Hence	 there	 were	 lacking	 the	 flexibility	 and	 potential	
transformative	 capacity	 that	 might	 otherwise	 have	 developed	 if	 the	 question	 of	 Westernization	 versus	
traditionalism	 constituted	 a	 continuous	 focus	 of	 discussion	 and	 did	 not	 give	 rise	 to	 mutually	 exclusive	
solutions.”47）	According	 to	 Eisenstadt’s	 argument,	 this	 predicament	 also	 involved	 the	 ideological	 confrontation	
characteristic	of	most	Axial-Age	civilizations,	which	developed	into	a	deadlock	in	China	because	of	its	particular	
historical	context	and	social	conditions.
V.	Conclusion:	reflection	upon	Eisenstadt’s	methodology
	 This	 paper	 does	 not	 attempt	 to	 delineate	 Japanese	 history	 from	 its	 tradition	 to	 modernity.	 Instead,	 by	
exploring	Eisenstadt’s	theories,	I	want	to	demonstrate	how	his	view	on	tradition	and	modernity	evolved	and	how	
he	 accommodated	 the	 development	 of	 Japan	 to	 a	 theoretical	 frame	 to	 explain	 its	 cultural	 uniqueness.	 The	
unconventionality	of	this	perspective	is	really	fascinating	and	thought-provoking.
	 Both	“tradition”	and	“modernity”	drew	Eisenstadt’s	concerns	early	from	his	career.	As	he	usually	interpreted	
modernity	to	be	both	the	succession	and	transformation	of	tradition,	in	his	early	works	the	process	was	basically	
44）	 Eisenstadt,	Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View,	p.432.
45）	 Ibid,	p.433.
46）	 Ibid,	p.424.
47）	 Eisenstadt,	Tradition, Change, and Modernity,	p.274.
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narrated	 in	a	historically-minded,	context-specific	manner.	However,	since	 the	1980s	when	he	began	 to	conduct	
systematic	 research	on	 the	Axial	Age	civilizations,	 it	 seems	 to	me	 that	Eisenstadt	 showed	a	 strong	 tendency	of	
viewing	 any	 tradition	 from	 a	 dichotomous,	 theoretical	 perspective	 –	 whether	 it	 experienced	 the	 Axial	 Age	
breakthrough	 or	 not	 –	 and	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 transcendental	 and	 mundane	 orders	 became	 an	 important	
criterion	in	his	analysis	of	a	civilization.	As	mentioned	above,	before	long	the	discussion	on	modernity	was	also	
drawn	in	this	orbit,	forming	a	framework	of	comparative	civilizations	which	is	characterized	by	both	temporality	
–	 tradition	 versus	 modernity	 –	 and	 spatiality	 –	 West	 versus	 East	 and	 Axial	 versus	 non-Axial	 civilizations.	
Perceptive	 and	 interesting	 indeed,	 however,	 this	model	might	 also	deprive	 tradition	of	 its	 own	value	because	 a	
tradition	must	be	categorized	in	terms	of	being	Axial	first,	and	then	be	examined	in	the	light	of	its	own	version	of	
modernity.	 In	 short,	 I	 cannot	 but	wonder	 that	 “tradition”	 in	 this	 framework	 is	managed	 to	 serve	 a	 causal	 view	
rather	 than	 constitutes	 a	 self-sufficient	 subject	 of	 study.	Applying	 this	 doubt	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Japan,	 perhaps	 the	
following	question	 is	worth	 raising:	would	Eisenstadt	 still	have	been	 interested	 in	 Japan	had	 it	not	experienced	
the	 Meiji	 Restoration	 and	 successful	 modernization?	Again	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 the	 title	 of	 Eisenstadt’s	 essay	
collection,	Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities,	had	betrayed	his	 intent	 to	 study	a	civilization’s	
tradition	 for	 the	 sole	 purpose	 to	 explain	 its	 modernity.	 This	 is	 the	 problem	 on	 temporality	 of	 Eisenstadt’s	
methodology.
	 In	 terms	 of	 spatiality,	 this	 framework	 also	 seems	 ideologically-deterministic	 as	 the	 following	 statement	
suggests:
The	distinctiveness	of	Japan	lies	in	its	being	the	only	non-Axial	civilization	that	maintained	–	throughout	its	
history,	up	 to	 the	modern	 time	–	a	history	of	 its	own,	without	becoming	 in	some	way	marginalized	by	 the	
Axial	civilizations,	China	and	Korea,	Confucianism	and	Buddhism,	with	which	it	was	in	continuous	contact.
	48）
In	 other	 words,	 Japan	 is	 interesting	 to	 Eisenstadt	 less	 because	 of	 its	 specific	 cultural	 contents	 and	 historical	
experiences	than	because	of	its	theoretical	attribute.	Therefore,	a	natural	outcome	of	this	approach	is	that	Japan’s	
tradition	must	be	studied	in	terms	of	its	modernization,	and	Japan	cannot	be	studied	independently	but	has	to	be	
fit	 into	a	comparative	frame	of	which	“axiality”	 is	 the	primary	criterion	of	making	distinction.	Furthermore,	 the	
objectivity	of	such	comparison	is	not	without	doubt	as	the	paradigm	of	Axial	Age	civilizations	is	based	on	Israeli	
and	Greek	experiences	–	only	two	of	the	axes	in	the	world	history.49）	If	we	are	to	claim	that	Japan	is	distinctive	
for	its	being	an	exception	to	this	model,	the	impartiality	of	the	model	–	its	parameters	and	overall	formulation	–	
must	be	a	prerequisite.	
	 Undeniably	 Eisenstadt	 showed	 great	 intellectual	 power	 to	 make	 connection	 between	 the	 Axial	 Age	
48）	 Eisenstadt,	Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View,	p.	14.
49）	 Eisenstadt	himself	was	not	unconscious	of	this	problem.	See	Arnason,	Johann	P.	et	al.:	“General	Introduction,”	in	Axial Civiliza-
tions and World History,	pp.1-12.
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civilizations	and	the	theory	of	modernization.	However,	as	Tominaga	Kenichi	indicates,	while	Eisenstadt’s	theory	
provides	one	way	to	explain	world	history,	such	formulation	was	in	nature	a	Western	construct.50）	We	should	not	
take	 this	 comment	 as	 Tominaga’s	 misunderstanding	 of	 or	 prejudice	 against	 Eisenstadt’s	 study	 on	 non-West	
civilizations.	Rather,	I	would	say	that	this	judgment	serves	as	a	reminder	that	Eisenstadt	had	never	had	first-hand	
knowledge	of	China	or	Japan;	he	reached	theoretical	conclusions	through	reading	published	materials	written	in	
Western	 languages,	 so	his	 opinions	or	 perspectives	 can	never	 be	 expected	 to	be	 thorough	or	 impartial.	Edward	
Shils	 also	 noted	 that	 Eisenstadt	was	 a	 theorist	 who	 accumulated	 his	 knowledge	 and	worked	 out	 his	 reasoning	
mainly	through	reading	published	works.51）	While	such	method	allows	a	scholar	 to	generalize,	characterize,	and	
theorize,	 viewing	 from	 the	 discipline	 of	 cultural	 interaction	 studies,	 how	 to	 strike	 a	 dynamic	 balance	 between	
theoretical	generality	and	historical	specificity	is	a	particularly	tempting	question	in	front	of	 this	model.	Indeed,	
one	of	the	reviewers	of	Eisenstadt’s	book	also	points	out	that	“what	claims	to	be	a	book	on	‘Japanese	Civilization’	
only	deals	with	a	very	small	part	of	‘Japan,’	mainly	at	the	middling,	institutional,	level.”	In	the	author’s	view,	any	
discussion	 on	 Japanese	 culture	 without	 mentioning	 its	 geography,	 ecology,	 rice	 agriculture,	 tea	 ceremony,	
aesthetics,	craftsmanship,	and	so	forth,	is	indeed	incomplete.52）	
	 One	more	 thing	 I	would	 like	 to	 say	about	 the	 theoretical	model	 is	 that,	Eisenstadt	 formed	his	view	on	 the	
Axial	Age	civilizations	out	of	a	sociologist’s	concern,	that	is	why	he	put	more	emphasis	on	the	institutionalization	
of	 transcendental	 views	 than	 on	 the	 historical	 backgrounds	 and	 cultural	 ramifications	 of	 such	 breakthroughs.	
Needless	to	say,	to	supplement	this	perspective	through	more	extensive	reading	and	more	varied	ways	of	thinking	
will	cause	inevitable	and	probably	large-scale	modification	of	the	framework.	
	 In	the	last	part	I	have	to	admit	that,	given	Eisenstadt’s	vast	scope	of	knowledge	and	writing,	I	have	to	apply	
certain	 limitations	 to	 this	 article	 for	 better	 illustrating	 only	 one	 line	 of	 his	 research.	 First,	 my	 references	 are	
mainly	limited	to	Eisenstadt’s	own	works,	taking	few	other	authors	into	consideration;	second,	while	I	deal	with	
several	of	Eisenstadt’s	core	concepts,	much	more	are	missing	in	this	paper;	third,	among	so	many	orientations	of	
a	society,	only	the	cultural	and	historical	ones	receive	my	attention	in	the	article,	others	are	not	allowed	into	this	
space.	 Last	 but	 not	 least,	 while	 Eisenstadt	 compared	 Japanese	 civilization	 to	 Europe,	 China,	 and	 India	 in	 his	
books,	 in	 this	paper	 I	can	only	slightly	 touch	upon	 the	comparison	with	China,	 leaving	other	 important	parts	 to	
later	 writing	 plan.	 Of	 course,	 my	 reference	 cannot	 be	 confined	 to	 Eisenstadt’s	 works	 in	 future	 study;	 more	
discussions	 on	modernization,	 on	 comparative	 civilizations	 and	 on	 Japanese	 culture	 and	 history	 are	 calling	 for	
critical	attention.	
50）	 Tominaga	Kenichi	(富永健一),	Theory of Modernization” the West and East in Modernization	(近代化の理論：近代化におけ
る西洋と東洋)	(講談社学術文庫,	1996),	pp.340-341.
51）	 Shils,	Edward,	“S.	N.	Eisenstadt:	Some	Personal	Observations”	in	Comparative Social Dynamics: Essays in Honor of S. N. 
Eisenstandt,	p.	6.
52）	 Macfarlane,	Alan,	“Review	of	S.	N.	Eisenstadt,	Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View,”	in	Cambridge Anthropology	(1998).
